

**Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

13 April 2018

Original: English

Second session

Geneva, 23 April–4 May 2018

Financial report

I. Introduction

1. The present financial report is submitted pursuant to the request by the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
2. To promote greater financial transparency and accountability, and taking into account the practice of multilateral and other organizations, the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, at the 12th plenary meeting, on 6 May 2008, of its second session, adopted a decision in which it requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to provide a financial report to the Review Conference and each session of its Preparatory Committee, to be circulated as an official document.
3. Recalling that the costs associated with the preparation and holding of the Review Conference and the sessions of its Preparatory Committee would be borne by the States parties to the Treaty and that there would be no financial implications for the regular budget of the United Nations, the Committee agreed, at the same meeting, that assessed and outstanding dues must be paid in proper time.

II. Observations

4. While most States parties are meeting their financial obligations, in some cases amounts outstanding since 1995 remain unpaid.

III. Financial status

5. The following table provides information, as at 12 April 2018, on the amounts owed by the States parties for each Review Conference cycle since 1995.



Amounts outstanding from States parties, by Review Conference cycle

(United States dollars)

State party	Review Conference cycle					Total
	2020-II	2020-I	2015	2010	1995, 2000 and 2005	
Afghanistan	43	—	—	—	—	43
Albania	94	92	102	—	—	288
Algeria	—	—	—	—	—	—
Andorra	—	—	—	—	—	—
Angola	126	92	309	—	—	527
Antigua and Barbuda	31	23	25	—	—	79
Argentina	7 616	—	—	—	—	7 616
Armenia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Australia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Austria	—	—	—	—	—	—
Azerbaijan	754	356	1 351	—	—	2 461
Bahamas	—	—	—	—	—	—
Bahrain	—	—	—	—	—	—
Bangladesh	126	92	419	—	—	637
Barbados	22	—	—	—	—	22
Belarus	—	—	—	—	—	—
Belgium	—	—	—	—	—	—
Belize	—	—	—	—	—	—
Benin	13	—	—	—	—	13
Bhutan	—	—	—	—	—	—
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	157	80	374	290	665	1 566
Bosnia and Herzegovina	—	—	—	—	—	—
Botswana	173	149	807	294	—	1 423
Brazil	28 931	—	—	—	—	28 931
Brunei Darussalam	—	—	—	—	—	—
Bulgaria	—	—	—	—	—	—
Burkina Faso	—	—	—	—	—	—
Burundi	16	11	15	—	—	42
Cabo Verde	16	11	58	—	—	85
Cambodia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Cameroon	52	—	—	—	—	52
Canada	—	—	—	—	—	—
Central African Republic	—	—	—	—	—	—
Chad	63	23	121	31	38	276
Chile	2 446	—	—	—	—	2 446
China	—	—	—	—	—	—
Colombia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Comoros	16	11	60	69	31	187
Congo	43	—	—	—	—	43
Costa Rica	—	—	—	—	—	—

State party	Review Conference cycle					Total
	2020-II	2020-I	2015	2010	1995, 2000 and 2005	
Côte d'Ivoire	—	—	—	—	—	—
Croatia	625	—	—	—	—	625
Cuba	—	—	—	—	—	—
Cyprus	—	—	—	—	—	—
Czechia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Democratic People's Republic of Korea ^a	—	—	—	—	—	—
Democratic Republic of the Congo	94	23	121	70	245	553
Denmark	1 172	—	—	—	—	1 172
Djibouti	16	11	53	—	—	80
Dominica	16	11	10	—	—	37
Dominican Republic	582	402	1 951	—	—	2 935
Ecuador	—	—	—	—	—	—
Egypt	822	—	—	—	—	822
El Salvador	173	138	770	1 065	1 183	3 329
Equatorial Guinea	126	92	—	—	—	218
Eritrea	—	—	—	—	—	—
Estonia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Ethiopia	75	—	—	—	—	75
Fiji	31	23	16	—	—	70
Finland	—	—	—	—	—	—
France	—	—	—	—	—	—
Gabon	220	172	193	201	529	1 315
Gambia	16	11	60	69	245	401
Georgia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Germany	—	—	—	—	—	—
Ghana	—	—	—	—	—	—
Greece	733	5 634	4 439	—	—	10 806
Grenada	16	9	—	—	—	25
Guatemala	—	—	—	—	—	—
Guinea	31	11	84	69	262	457
Guinea-Bissau	16	11	60	31	245	363
Guyana	—	—	—	—	—	—
Haiti	—	—	—	—	—	—
Holy See	—	—	—	—	—	—
Honduras	94	69	203	—	—	366
Hungary	—	—	—	—	—	—
Iceland	—	—	—	—	—	—
Indonesia	3 690	—	—	—	—	3 690
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	5 914	1 403	—	—	—	7 317
Iraq	—	—	—	—	—	—
Ireland	—	—	—	—	—	—
Italy	—	—	—	—	—	—

State party	Review Conference cycle					Total
	2020-II	2020-I	2015	2010	1995, 2000 and 2005	
Jamaica	19	—	—	—	—	19
Japan	—	—	—	—	—	—
Jordan	—	—	—	—	—	—
Kazakhstan	1 536	—	—	—	—	1 536
Kenya	220	115	578	292	—	1 205
Kiribati	16	11	60	31	—	118
Kuwait	—	—	—	—	—	—
Kyrgyzstan	31	23	97	69	1 008	1 228
Lao People's Democratic Republic	—	—	—	—	—	—
Latvia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Lebanon	230	—	—	—	—	230
Lesotho	16	11	19	—	—	46
Liberia	16	11	15	—	—	42
Libya	—	—	—	—	—	—
Liechtenstein	11	—	—	—	—	11
Lithuania	350	—	—	—	—	350
Luxembourg	—	—	—	—	—	—
Madagascar	31	23	74	—	—	128
Malawi	31	23	97	69	118	338
Malaysia	4 042	2 478	2 224	—	—	8 744
Maldives	—	—	—	—	—	—
Mali	31	34	156	69	272	562
Malta	62	—	—	—	—	62
Marshall Islands	16	—	71	32	—	119
Mauritania	31	23	97	69	303	523
Mauritius	—	—	—	—	—	—
Mexico	623	—	—	—	—	623
Micronesia (Federated States of)	2	11	60	50	—	123
Monaco	—	—	—	—	—	—
Mongolia	63	23	23	—	—	109
Montenegro	—	—	—	—	—	—
Morocco	—	—	—	—	—	—
Mozambique	47	23	23	—	—	93
Myanmar	75	—	—	—	—	75
Namibia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Nauru	2	11	2	—	—	15
Nepal	79	57	301	145	6	588
Netherlands	—	—	—	—	—	—
New Zealand	1 103	—	—	—	—	1 103
Nicaragua	34	—	—	—	—	34
Niger	—	—	—	—	—	—
Nigeria	2 627	792	2 672	—	—	6 091

State party	Review Conference cycle					Total
	2020-II	2020-I	2015	2010	1995, 2000 and 2005	
Norway	—	—	—	—	—	—
Oman	583	—	—	—	—	583
Palau	5	—	—	—	—	5
Panama	199	—	—	—	—	199
Papua New Guinea	38	11	—	—	—	49
Paraguay	173	92	375	—	—	640
Peru	—	—	—	—	—	—
Philippines	2 076	1 354	4 298	—	—	7 728
Poland	—	—	—	—	—	—
Portugal	—	—	—	—	—	—
Qatar	—	—	—	—	—	—
Republic of Korea	—	—	—	—	—	—
Republic of Moldova	—	—	—	—	—	—
Romania	—	—	—	—	—	—
Russian Federation	—	—	—	—	—	—
Rwanda	31	23	97	32	—	183
Saint Kitts and Nevis	16	11	54	—	—	81
Saint Lucia	16	11	12	31	264	334
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	16	11	54	—	—	81
Samoa	—	—	—	—	—	—
San Marino	—	—	—	—	—	—
Sao Tome and Principe	16	11	60	31	245	363
Saudi Arabia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Senegal	—	—	—	—	—	—
Serbia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Seychelles	16	11	84	40	245	396
Sierra Leone	—	—	—	—	—	—
Singapore	—	—	—	—	—	—
Slovakia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Slovenia	—	—	—	—	—	—
Solomon Islands	—	—	—	—	—	—
Somalia	14	5	—	—	—	19
South Africa	1 450	—	—	—	—	1 450
Spain	4 218	—	—	—	—	4 218
Sri Lanka	—	—	—	—	—	—
Sudan	126	92	419	—	—	637
Suriname	49	—	—	—	—	49
Swaziland	31	23	121	78	272	525
Sweden	5 767	—	—	—	—	5 767
Switzerland	—	—	—	—	—	—
Syrian Arab Republic	37	321	1 469	478	—	2 305
Tajikistan	47	23	121	31	—	222

State party	Review Conference cycle					Total
	2020-II	2020-I	2015	2010	1995, 2000 and 2005	
Thailand	—	—	—	—	—	—
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	56	—	—	—	—	56
Timor-Leste	13	—	—	—	—	13
Togo	16	11	60	22	—	109
Tonga	5	—	—	—	—	5
Trinidad and Tobago	72	—	—	—	—	72
Tunisia	35	—	—	—	—	35
Turkey	—	—	—	—	—	—
Turkmenistan	330	172	1 022	116	—	1 640
Tuvalu	16	11	60	31	245	363
Uganda	14	57	301	57	—	429
Ukraine	—	—	—	—	—	—
United Arab Emirates	7 581	5 256	11 398	—	—	24 235
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	—	—	—	—	—	—
United Republic of Tanzania	67	—	—	—	—	67
United States of America	—	—	—	—	—	—
Uruguay	869	—	—	—	—	869
Uzbekistan	207	—	—	—	—	207
Vanuatu	16	11	60	31	27	145
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	7 172	5 531	22 244	—	—	34 947
Viet Nam	724	367	1 757	297	—	3 145
Yemen	126	92	482	358	434	1 492
Zambia	94	57	64	—	—	215
Zimbabwe	47	23	121	178	—	369
Total	98 928	26 216	62 903	4 826	6 882	199 755

* The status of the membership of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is uncertain.

Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Japan

Action 20 of the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons calls on States parties to submit regular reports on their implementation of the action plan and of the 13 practical steps towards disarmament contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”. Action 21 of the action plan states that, as a confidence-building measure, all the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security. Japan submits this report in accordance with these commitments.

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Action number	Actions	Examples of information to include (if applicable)	Actions taken by Japan
I. Nuclear disarmament			
I	All States parties commit to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.	Summary of national policy on nuclear disarmament, including any relevant initiatives and actions which serve to illustrate the policy. Membership in regional multilateral groups that promote nuclear disarmament.	As the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings, Japan remains strongly committed to strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime on all of its three pillars, and moving closer towards a world free of nuclear weapons. Japan is of the view that, in order to make our way towards a world free of nuclear weapons, it is essential to build up practical and concrete measures on the basis of cooperation between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, while not losing sight of a clear recognition of the humanitarian aspects of the use of nuclear weapons and an objective assessment of the severe international security environment. Japan has been playing an active role in the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, a cross-regional group of non-nuclear-weapon States that is committed to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the essential foundation for the achievement of nuclear disarmament and the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, and has proposed concrete and effective measures to move forward with nuclear disarmament: - Japan is committed to making progress in concrete and practical measures by, among other things, promoting the transparency of nuclear forces, submitting resolutions to the General Assembly calling for united action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, making active contributions towards an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pursuing the early commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as participating actively in discussions on nuclear disarmament verification; - Japan has been engaged in raising awareness of the reality of atomic bombings and clear recognition of its humanitarian consequences across borders and generations.

Actions *Examples of information to include (if applicable)* *Actions taken by Japan*

- 2 All States parties commit to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their treaty obligations.
- National policy on irreversibility, verifiability and transparency, including any relevant initiatives and actions which serve to illustrate the policy.
- Support for relevant General Assembly resolutions that support irreversibility, verifiability and transparency.
- Japan reaffirms the importance of the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of treaty obligations:
- Japan calls upon all States to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the process of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation through resolutions submitted to the General Assembly;
 - Japan submitted a working paper on nuclear-weapon State transparency to the 2015 Review Conference, which encouraged nuclear-weapon States to agree on a standard reporting form and to submit it annually in the context of strengthening the Treaty review process;
 - Japan, with the other 11 members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, submitted working papers on transparency to the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty in 2012 and 2014 and to the 2015 Review Conference respectively. In the 2020 review process, the Initiative has remained committed to its efforts to increase transparency by submitting working papers on transparency to the Preparatory Committee in 2017 and 2018.

- 3 In implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear-weapon States commit to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures.
- (Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)

4	The Russian Federation and the United States of America commit to seek the early entry into force and full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and are encouraged to continue discussions on follow-on measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals.	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)
5	The nuclear-weapon States commit to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in a way that promotes international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security. To that end, they are called upon to promptly engage with a view to, inter alia:	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)
5 (a)	Rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons, as identified in action 3;	

Action number	Duration	Examples of information to include (if applicable)	Action taken by Japan
5 (b)	Address the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process;	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)	
5 (c)	To further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies;	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)	
5 (d)	Discuss policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons;	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)	
5 (e)	Consider the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security;	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)	
5 (f)	Reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)	
5 (g)	Further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence.	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)	

Action number	Actions	Examples of information to include (if applicable)	Actions taken by Japan
6	All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.	Support for the establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament, including through support for relevant draft programmes of work of the Conference, Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers and/or General Assembly resolutions. Participation in any working groups on nuclear disarmament	Japan supported the establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament as a chair of the Conference in 2014. Japan also supported the decision put forward by the Sri Lankan President to establish subsidiary bodies on agenda items 1 to 4, and one on agenda items 5, 6 and 7, contained in document CD/WP.605 in 2018. Japan has consistently called for the adoption of a programme of work that leads to the negotiation of a disarmament treaty in the Conference, Mr. Nobushige Takamizawa, Ambassador of the Permanent Mission of Japan to the Conference, stressed the importance of adopting a comprehensive and balanced programme of work at the 1434th plenary meeting of the Conference, in 2018. The following political figures called on all members of the Conference in the recent high-level segments of this body to adopt such a programme of work: - Mr. Manabu Hori, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan in 2018 - Mr. Motome Takisawa, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan in 2017 - Mr. Masakazu Hamachi, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan in 2016 - Mr. Takashi Uto, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan in 2015 In the General Assembly resolution entitled "United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons", submitted by Japan and adopted by a substantial majority, Japan has for years stressed the need to continue to explore possibilities for overcoming the ongoing deadlock of more than two decades in the Conference on Disarmament

- 7 All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately begin discussion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of nuclear weapons, to discuss substantively, without limitation, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument. The Review Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.
- Support for the establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to discuss effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of nuclear weapons, including through support for relevant draft programmes of work of the Conference, Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers and or General Assembly resolutions.
- In the General Assembly resolution entitled "United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons", submitted by Japan and adopted by a substantial majority, Japan has stressed the importance of security assurances by nuclear-weapon States.
- Japan and the other 11 members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative submitted a working paper on "Nuclear-weapon-free zones and negative security assurances" to the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty in 2013.
- Japan participated in the ASEAN Regional Forum Workshop on Promoting a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status of Mongolia, held in Mongolia in September 2015.
- Mr. Motome Takisawa, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, participated in the international conference on "Building a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World", which was hosted by Kazakhstan to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site.
- 8 All nuclear-weapon States (Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States) commit to fully respect their existing commitments with regard to security assurances. Those nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so are encouraged to extend security

Action number	Actions	Examples of information to include, if applicable <i>(Actions taken by Japan)</i>
assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.		
9	The establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones, where appropriate, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 Guidelines of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, is encouraged. All concerned States are encouraged to ratify the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and their relevant protocols, and to constructively consult and cooperate to bring about the entry into force of the relevant legally binding protocols of all such nuclear-weapon free zones treaties, which include negative security assurances. The concerned States are encouraged to review any related reservations.	(For all States) National efforts to support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. Support for relevant General Assembly resolutions and or Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers that support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Name of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty to which your country is party (For nuclear-weapon States) Summary of efforts (including current status and future prospects) to ratify the relevant protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties or to review any related reservations on the ratification of such protocols. Current status of consultations and cooperation on entry into force of the relevant protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zones Japan contributed to drafting of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia by organizing expert meetings in Sapporo, Japan, in October 1999 and April 2000. Japan has organized the United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues with the United Nations and nuclear-weapon-free zones have been one of the agenda items of discussion. Japan has contributed to the discussion and promotion of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Japan participated as an observer in the second and third Conferences of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia. Japan has supported General Assembly resolutions regarding five treaties of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia. In the General Assembly resolution entitled "United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons", submitted by Japan and adopted by a substantial majority, Japan stressed the importance of the establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones in accordance with the 1999 guidelines of the Disarmament Commission. Mr. Yamada, Ambassador of Japan to Mexico, participated in the ceremony of the fiftieth anniversary of the conclusion of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco). Japan hosted an unofficial conference on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East in Nagasaki in December 2016.

Action number	Action	Examples of information to include if applicable	Actions taken by Japan
10	All nuclear-weapon States undertake to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty with all expediency, noting that positive decisions by nuclear-weapon States would have the beneficial impact towards the ratification of that Treaty, and that nuclear-weapon States have the special responsibility to encourage Annex 2 countries, in particular those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify.	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)	
11	Pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, all States commit to refrain from nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, the use of new nuclear weapons technologies and from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of that Treaty, and all existing moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions should be maintained.	Date of signature and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Current status of the reporting State's policy on the moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions.	Japan signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty on 24 September 1996 and ratified it on 8 July 1997. Japan amended its Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors when it ratified the Treaty. In the General Assembly resolution entitled "United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons", submitted by Japan and adopted by a substantial majority, Japan has continuously stressed the importance of the early entry into force of the Treaty and of the moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions. Japan served in an important role as an Article XIV Coordinator of the Treaty, together with Kazakhstan, from 2015 to 2017, stressing the importance of the early entry into force of the Treaty and of the moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions.

Action number	Actions	Examples of information to include (if applicable)	Actions taken by Japan
12	All States that have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty recognize the contribution of the conferences on facilitating the entry into force of that Treaty and of the measures adopted by consensus at the Sixth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held in September 2009, and commit to report at the 2011 Conference on progress made towards the urgent entry into force of that Treaty.	Confirmation that commitment was met to report at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (Article XIV Conference) held in 2011 on progress made towards the urgent entry into force of that Treaty. Summary of reports made at the subsequent Article XIV Conferences on progress made towards the entry into force of that Treaty.	September 2009–August 2011 <u>September 2009–August 2011</u> In bilateral consultations, Japan urged several Annex 2 States that had not yet signed or ratified the Treaty to do so at the earliest opportunity. March 2010 Japan invited an Indonesian Diet member and a government official to visit International Monitoring System facilities hosted by Japan and to exchange views on the Treaty with the Japanese authorities. March 2010 Japan invited an Egyptian delegation headed by the Director of the Egyptian National Data Centre to visit International Monitoring System facilities hosted by Japan and to exchange views on the Treaty with Japanese authorities. September 2011–August 2013 <u>September 2011–August 2013</u> Japan took every appropriate opportunity in its bilateral meetings with non-ratifying Annex 2 States to encourage those States to sign and or ratify the Treaty. June 2013–May 2015 <u>June 2013–May 2014</u> Japan took every suitable opportunity in its bilateral contacts with the remaining Annex 2 States to encourage the signature and or ratification of the Treaty. June 2014–May 2015 <u>June 2014–May 2015</u> Japan took every suitable opportunity in its bilateral contacts with the remaining Annex 2 States, at both the political and official levels, to encourage the signature and or ratification of the Treaty. See www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/article-xiv-conferences/.

Action number	Actions	Examples of information to include (if applicable)	Actions taken by Japan
13	All States that have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty undertake to promote the entry into force and implementation of that Treaty at the national, regional and global levels.	Activities to promote the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the national, regional and global levels, in particular a summary of efforts to encourage all States that have yet to do so to sign and ratify the Treaty (e.g., positions on General Assembly resolutions; participation in Article XIV Conferences or Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty ministerial meetings; participation in Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers and/or national, regional, multilateral activities). Summary of national efforts to fully implement the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (e.g., national legislation or policies). List any nationals who participate in the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Group of Eminent Persons.	Japan, along with Kazakhstan, co-presided over the ninth Article XIV Conference, held on 29 September 2015 in New York. Since then, Japan, as the co-coordinator for the entry into force of the Treaty, has led and coordinated international efforts for the promotion of its entry into force. Japan hosted a Group of Eminent Persons meeting in Hiroshima, Japan, in August 2015 to discuss strategies for advancing the Treaty. Japan and Kazakhstan adopted the summit-level joint statement on the Treaty in Astana on 27 October 2015. Japan has co-chaired the ministerial meeting of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty group, which convenes a high-level meeting biannually. On 21 September 2016, the eighth ministerial meeting was held in New York and adopted a joint ministerial statement. The State Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan attended the twentieth anniversary ministerial meeting of the Treaty, on 13 June 2016. Japan, together with Kazakhstan, supported a commemorative exhibition in Vienna, which outlined the history of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its verification regime. Japan hosted a regional conference in 2017 for States in South-East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East to promote the Treaty in that region. Japan co-sponsored and voted in favour of the annual General Assembly resolution entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty".
14	The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization is to be encouraged to fully develop the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including early completion and provisional operationalization of the	Summary of national efforts to construct, complete and/or certify International Monitoring System stations. Summary of national efforts to help the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization strengthen its verification regime (e.g., workshops, seminars, training, exercises, voluntary funding	All the International Monitoring System stations and a laboratory hosted by Japan (six seismological stations, one infrasound station, two radionuclide stations and one laboratory) have been certified by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. Japan made a voluntary contribution of approximately \$2.4 million to the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to further boost its verification abilities in 2017. Japan made a voluntary contribution \$747,026 in 2011 and \$455,000 in 2013.

Action number	Actions	Examples of information to include (if applicable)	Actions taken by Japan
12/33	international monitoring system in accordance with the mandate of the Preparatory Commission, which should, upon entry into force of that Treaty, serve as an effective, reliable, participatory and non-discriminatory verification system with global reach, and provide assurance of compliance with that Treaty.	contributions and or in-kind contributions). Summary of national efforts to help develop the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization's on-site inspection capabilities.	Towards the entry into force of the Treaty, Japan has provided a global seismological observation training course since 1995 to introduce up-to-date technologies and knowledge in that field.
15	All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately begin negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein. Also in this respect, the Review Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.	Support for launching negotiations on a treaty to ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, including through support for relevant draft programmes of work of the Conference on Disarmament, General Assembly resolutions and or Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers. Summary of contributions to the Group of Governmental Experts on the subject. Summary of contributions to the high-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group.	Japan strongly supports the objectives of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, known as a fissile material cut-off treaty, and has called for the early commencement of negotiations on the treaty on numerous occasions, including in the General Assembly resolution entitled "United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons", which Japan has submitted to the Assembly every year. Japan, with the other member countries of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, submitted a working paper on fissile material cut-off treaty to the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty in 2012 and 2017. In 2011, Japan and Australia co-hosted experts' side events in Geneva on the margins of the Conference on Disarmament to discuss technical aspects of a treaty and to maintain momentum for a commencement of negotiations in the Conference. Japan, as a member of the Group of Governmental Experts on a fissile material cut-off treaty, actively participated in and contributed to discussions in the Group, which met in Geneva in four sessions of two weeks each in 2014 and 2015. Japan also has been engaged in the high-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group and contributed constructively to the discussions as a member of the group.

16 The nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to commit to declare, as appropriate, to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) all fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes and to place such material as soon as practicable under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.

17 In the context of action 16, all States are encouraged to support the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military purposes.

Action number	Actions	Examples of information to include (if applicable): <i>Actions taken by Japan</i>	
18	All States that have not yet done so are encouraged to initiate a process towards the dismantling or conversion for peaceful uses of facilities for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)	
19	All States agree on the importance of supporting cooperation among Governments, the United Nations, other international and regional organizations and civil society aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient verification capabilities related to nuclear disarmament.	Any cooperation among Governments, the United Nations and civil society aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient verification capabilities related to nuclear disarmament. Summary of national, regional and international efforts to promote greater transparency, confidence and efficiency in the verification of nuclear disarmament.	Japan has participated actively in the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, which is an international initiative to further understand and find solutions to the complex challenges involved in the verification of nuclear disarmament, by sending experts to all working groups. Recognizing the Partnership as a strong vehicle for practical and concrete measures to realize the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, Japan hosted its third plenary meeting in Tokyo in June 2016. Japan has emphasized the importance of the efforts to develop nuclear disarmament verification capabilities in the General Assembly resolution entitled "United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons", which Japan submits to the Assembly every year. Japan, as co-sponsor, supported the General Assembly resolution entitled "Nuclear disarmament verification" and will actively participate in discussions of the group of government experts on nuclear disarmament verification that will be established pursuant to the resolution.

- 20** States parties should submit regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Treaty, on the implementation of the present action plan, as well as of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996,
- Year and official document symbol of all regular reports on the implementation of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.
- Japan submitted a working paper on transparency by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the 2015 Review Conference, which encouraged nuclear-weapon States to agree on a standard reporting form and to submit it annually in the context of strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process.
- Japan, with the other members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, submitted a working paper on non-nuclear-weapon State transparency, which included a draft reporting template for non-nuclear-weapon States, to the 2015 Review Conference.
- Japan, with the other members of the Initiative, submitted working papers on transparency to the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty in 2012 and 2014, respectively.
- The previous reports of Japan on its implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference are contained in documents NPT CONF 2015 PC III 4 (2014) and NPT CONF 2020 PC I 9 (2017).
- This report by Japan on the implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference updates our report of 2017.
- 21** As a confidence-building measure, all the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is invited to establish a publicly accessible repository, which shall include the information provided by the nuclear-weapon States.
- (For nuclear-weapon States)
Any agreed standard reporting form and determined reporting intervals.
Summary of efforts to agree on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security.
- (For non-nuclear-weapon States)
Summary of efforts to encourage the nuclear-weapon States to agree on a standard reporting form and to determine an appropriate reporting interval
- As a part of efforts to promote the implementation of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference, Japan, with the other member countries of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, submitted three working papers on transparency to the Preparatory Committee in 2012 ("Transparency on nuclear weapons") and 2014 ("Increased transparency in nuclear disarmament") and to the 2015 Review Conference ("Transparency by non-nuclear-weapon States parties"), respectively.
- In addition, Japan submitted a working paper on transparency, reporting and strengthening the review process to the 2015 Review Conference, proposing a text to be included in the final document of the 2015 Review Conference.
- In 2017, Japan, with the other member countries of the Initiative, submitted a working paper ("Transparency by all States parties to the Treaty"), with a new reporting template that can be used by all States parties to provide information about how they have implemented their commitments under the action plan of 2010, to the Preparatory Committee in 2017.

Action number	Action	Examples of information to include (if applicable)	Information taken by Japan
22	All States are encouraged to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/57/124) regarding the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, in order to advance the goals of the Treaty in support of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.	Summary of efforts to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation education (e.g., contributions to the report of the Secretary-General, adding the subject to school curriculums, seminars, conferences, exhibitions, partnerships with civil society, public events, social media events, contests).	As the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings, Japan is committed to ensuring that the humanitarian consequences and tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki will never be forgotten. With this aim, Japan places utmost importance on disarmament and non-proliferation education, especially for the younger generation. Japan has invited young diplomats from various countries through the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme every year since 1983. Japan has sponsored the United Nations Conferences on Disarmament Issues in different cities since 1989, where representatives of States, the United Nations, academic institutions and civil society from around the world engage in useful discussions. Japan submitted a joint working paper on disarmament and non-proliferation education with the other members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative to the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2017, following a joint working paper submitted to the 2015 Review Conference. Japan also made a joint statement on disarmament and non-proliferation education on behalf of 76 countries at the 2015 Review Conference.
			Japan started a programme entitled "Special communicator for a world without nuclear weapons" in 2010 for the purpose of sharing the firsthand experience of atomic bombing survivors (hibakusha). In addition, Japan launched a new programme entitled "Youth communicator for a world without nuclear weapons" in 2013. Under this programme, young people are expected to share the tragic consequences of nuclear weapons and their thoughts about possible steps across borders and generations. Japan has undertaken efforts to make the testimonies of hibakusha more widely available and translated them into 13 languages. In 2015, the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in cooperation with the Japanese Government, opened a permanent exhibition on the atomic bombings at the United Nations Office at Vienna, following those in New York and Geneva, to promote understanding of the terrible devastation caused by the use of nuclear weapons.

II. Nuclear non-proliferation

23	The Conference calls upon all States parties to exert all efforts to promote universal adherence to the Treaty, and not to undertake any actions that can negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty.	Summary of efforts to promote universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.	Japan took every opportunity in its bilateral meetings to encourage non-ratifying States in appropriate international forums. In paragraph 5 of the General Assembly resolution entitled "United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons", submitted by Japan, Japan called upon all States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accede as non-nuclear-weapon States to the Treaty promptly and without any conditions to achieve its universality and, pending their accession to the Treaty, to adhere to its terms and to take practical steps in support of the Treaty.
24	The Conference re-endorses the call by previous review conferences for the application of IAEA comprehensive safeguards to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the States parties in accordance with the provisions of article III of the Treaty.	Summary of safeguards agreements concluded with IAEA, such as a comprehensive safeguards agreement, Additional Protocol and/or Modified Small Quantities Protocol.	Japan signed the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in March 1977 and the Agreement entered into force in December 1977. Japan signed its Additional Protocol in December 1998 and it entered into force in December 1999.
25	The Conference, noting that 17 States parties to the Treaty have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, urges them to do so as soon as possible and without further delay.	Summary of efforts to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement, or to facilitate and encourage others to do so.	Japan continues to promote the universal acceptance of an IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, together with the model Additional Protocol to the Agreement, as the international verification standard and calls upon all States that have not yet done so to sign and bring into force the Additional Protocol.

No.	Topic	Chair	Secretary	Observer
26	The Conference underscores the importance in complying with the non-proliferation obligations, addressing all compliance matters in order to uphold the Treaty's integrity and the authority of the safeguards system.	Summary of national efforts to comply with non-proliferation obligations. Examples of initiatives, including through Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers, that promote high international standards of compliance. Summary of IAEA conclusions about the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.	Japan has implemented the obligations of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement between it and IAEA and the Additional Protocol to it and has been making efforts to ensure the transparency of its nuclear activities. "Broader conclusion" has been consistently drawn since it was drawn for the first time in the IAEA safeguards statement for 2003. Japan is committed to strengthening nuclear non-proliferation. In particular, as a designated member of the IAEA Board of Governors, Japan has been cooperating fully with IAEA and providing appropriate support to its activities.	
27	The Conference underscores the importance of resolving all cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations in full conformity with the IAEA statute and the respective legal obligations of Member States. In this regard, the Conference calls upon Member States to extend their cooperation to the Agency.	Summary of national steps taken to address cases of non-compliance with Non-Proliferation Treaty non-proliferation obligations, including the implementation of sanctions regimes imposed by the Security Council or statements in relevant international forums, such as the IAEA General Conference or Board of Governors.	Japan implements sanctions upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (sanctions imposed by Security Council resolutions and unilateral sanctions). Japan has delivered statements on Democratic People's Republic of Korea issues in relevant international forums, such as the IAEA General Conference and Board of Governors. Japan has co-sponsored Democratic People's Republic of Korea resolutions at the IAEA General Conference. Japan has been contributing to the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, including assistance through IAEA. In 2017, Japan supported the national training course on safeguards implementation in the Islamic Republic of Iran.	

Action number	Actions	Examples of information to include, if applicable	Actions taken by Japan
28	The Conference encourages all States parties which have not yet done so to conclude and to bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force.	Date of signature and entry into force of an Additional Protocol agreement with IAEA. Summary of efforts to implement the Additional Protocol or to encourage and facilitate others to do so.	Japan has been actively working towards the universalization of the model Additional Protocol and continues to provide necessary assistance, especially for Asian countries. Japan has organized outreach events in some countries through the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security and supported IAEA safeguards seminars to facilitate safeguards implementation, including the Additional Protocol. Japan supported the seminars on promoting the conclusion of Additional Protocols held by IAEA in Ethiopia and the Sudan in 2017 and the seminars held under the joint auspices of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency, the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security and partner countries in Thailand and the Lao People's Democratic Republic in 2018.
29	The Conference encourages IAEA to further facilitate and assist the States parties in the conclusion and entry into force of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The Conference calls on States parties to consider specific measures that would promote the universalization of the comprehensive safeguards agreements.	Summary of national, regional and/or multilateral efforts to promote or assist other States in concluding or implementing a comprehensive safeguards agreement	Japan has organized outreach events in some countries through the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security and supported IAEA safeguards seminars to facilitate safeguards implementation, including the Additional Protocol. At the time of the IAEA General Assembly in September 2017, Japan hosted a side event on the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of the model Additional Protocol. Japan participated in and contributed to the annual meeting of the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Meeting Network, held in the Republic of Korea in October 2017.
30	The Conference calls for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States, under the relevant voluntary offer safeguards agreements, in the most economic and practical way possible.	Summary of support for efforts to apply safeguards more widely in nuclear-weapon States (e.g., Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers)	The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative presented a working paper on "Wider application of safeguards in the nuclear-weapon States" to the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty in 2013. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000182256.pdf

<i>Action number</i>	<i>Actions</i>	<i>Examples of information to include (if applicable)</i>	<i>Actions taken by Japan</i>
20/33	taking into account the availability of IAEA resources, and stresses that comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.	31 The Conference encourages all States parties with small quantities protocols which have not yet done so to amend or rescind them, as appropriate, as soon as possible.	Japan calls upon all States to adopt the modified Small Quantities Protocol, where relevant.
32	The Conference recommends that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA policy bodies aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented.	Summary of efforts to review and evaluate IAEA safeguards, including efforts to support decisions to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards.	Japan works to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of IAEA safeguards. In particular, as a designated member of the IAEA Board of Governors, Japan supports the efforts of the Director General and Board to continually strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of those safeguards.
33	The Conference calls upon all States parties to ensure that IAEA continues to have all political, technical and financial support so that it is able to effectively meet its responsibility to apply safeguards as required by article III of the Treaty.	Summary of status of payment of assessed contributions to IAEA. Summary of extrabudgetary, voluntary and or in-kind contributions to IAEA.	Japan has been the second largest by scale of total payment of assessed, extrabudgetary and voluntary contributions to IAEA.

34

The Conference encourages States parties, within the framework of the IAEA statute, to further develop a robust, flexible, adaptive and cost-effective international technology base for advanced safeguards through cooperation among Member States and with IAEA.

Summary of contributions to the development of an international technology base to help improve IAEA safeguards.

The Japan Support Programme for Agency Safeguards contributes to strengthening international safeguards through improvements in the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation by transferring Japanese technology and expertise to IAEA.

The Japan Atomic Energy Agency operates the Clean Laboratory for Environmental Analysis and Research as a member of the IAEA safeguards network laboratories.

35

The Conference urges all States parties to ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated, particularly, in articles I, II and III of the Treaty, as well as the decision on principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference.

Summary of efforts in export control regimes (e.g., the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, the Wassenaar Arrangement), Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and its reporting mechanism and other arrangements (e.g., domestic legislation or bilateral agreements) that help to ensure nuclear-related exports do not lead to proliferation.

Japan has redoubled its nuclear non-proliferation efforts through the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee, as well as through the implementation of obligations related to nuclear non-proliferation, such as the establishment of effective national export controls stipulated by Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). Japan contributes positively to the activities of the Nuclear Suppliers Group by, for example, assuming the role of the Point of Contact through its Permanent Mission to the International Organizations in Vienna.

36

The Conference encourages States parties to make use of multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and understandings in developing their own national export controls.

Summary of the implementation of nuclear export control lists in domestic export control legislation and or regulations.

Japan regularly updates its domestic export control regulations in accordance with changes in multilaterally agreed nuclear export control lists.

Action number	Actions	Examples of information to include (if applicable)	Actions taken by Japan
37	The Conference encourages States parties to consider whether a recipient State has brought into force IAEA safeguards obligations in making nuclear export decisions.	Summary of efforts to show that the safeguards and compliance record of a recipient State is taken into account in making nuclear export decisions.	Japan, in accordance with multilaterally agreed guidelines, considers whether a recipient State has brought into force IAEA safeguards obligations when making its export decisions.
38	The Conference calls upon all States parties, in acting in pursuance of the objectives of the Treaty, to observe the legitimate right of all States parties, in particular developing States, to full access to nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes.	Support for the legitimate right of States to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, such as by providing a list of States with which nuclear cooperation agreements have been completed.	Please refer to the following blue book on Japanese foreign policy regarding the list of countries with which Japan has bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook_2017/html/chapter3/c030104.html → “(4) Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy: B Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement”
39	States parties are encouraged to facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and materials and international cooperation among States parties, in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty, and to eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty.	Summary of key policy criteria considered when determining whether or not to engage in nuclear cooperation with a State.	Please refer to the following blue book on Japanese foreign policy regarding its policy on nuclear cooperation: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook_2017/html/chapter3/c030104.html → “(4) Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy: B Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement”

40	The Conference encourages all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities.	Summary of efforts to strengthen the physical protection of nuclear facilities, particularly by the national regulatory agency. Summary of efforts undertaken to implement commitments made in the Nuclear Security Summit process.	The 2016 Nuclear Security Summit was the occasion to announce various efforts made by Japan. Please see the following page for a summary of efforts: http://www.mofa.go.jp/dns/n_s/ne/page3e_000467.html
41	The Conference encourages all States parties to apply, as appropriate, the IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities (INFCIRC/225 Rev.4 (Corrected)) and other relevant international instruments at the earliest possible date.	Summary of efforts to apply the IAEA INFCIRC/225 Rev.4 (Corrected). Timeline for any planned national reviews of physical protection policies and practices or any reviews that have been accomplished.	Japan takes various physical protection measures in line with the Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors, etc. Those measures have been recommended in IAEA guidance documents, including Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225 Rev.5) and INFCIRC/225 Rev.4 (Corrected), and other relevant international instruments. With reference to the requirements in INFCIRC/225 Rev.5 and other relevant international instruments, the International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission in 2015 recognized that Japan has a robust and sustainable nuclear security regime, significantly enhanced in recent years. The latest measure was the revision of Nuclear Regulation Authority ordinances in September 2016 to tackle insider threats. The trustworthiness check by operators started in November 2017.
42	The Conference calls on all States parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to ratify the amendment to the Convention as soon as possible and encourages them to act in accordance with the objectives and the	Summary of progress in signing, ratifying and implementing the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment. Summary of efforts to promote the ratification and implementation of the Convention and its 2005 Amendment.	Japan became a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 1988 and its 2005 Amendment in 2014. Please see the following page: http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_000334.html

Action number	Actions	Examples of information to include (if applicable)	Actions taken by Japan
	purpose of the amendment until such time as it enters into force. The Conference also encourages all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention and adopt the amendment as soon as possible.		
43	The Conference urges all States parties to implement the principles of the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, as well as the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2004.	Summary of steps taken to implement the principles of the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. Summary of steps taken to implement the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.	The IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service mission to Japan issued its report. Please see section 2.1 (International obligations and arrangements for international cooperation): https://www.nsr.go.jp/data/000148261.pdf Japan issued a national statement at the Washington Nuclear Security Summit in 2010. Please see the following page: http://japan.kantei.go.jp/hatoyama/statement/20100412statement_e.html
44	The Conference calls upon all States parties to improve their national capabilities to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories, in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations, and calls upon those States parties in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity-building in this regard. The Conference also calls upon States parties to establish	Summary of efforts to strengthen national capabilities against the illicit trafficking of nuclear material. Summary of efforts to provide assistance to other States to strengthen national capabilities against the illicit trafficking of nuclear material (e.g., commitments made in the context of the Nuclear Security Summit process, the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction). Information about participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative.	Japan's recent matrix regarding the status of its implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), approved by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), is: http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/documents/Japan%20revised%20matrix.pdf Japan made proactive contributions during its presidency of the Global Partnership in 2016. Japan has participated proactively in the Proliferation Security Initiative exercises and meetings. Japan will host the Initiative's maritime interdiction exercise in 2018. Japan hosted the plenary meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in Tokyo in June 2017: http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001613.html

and enforce effective domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations.

Information about participation in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

Summary of any reports provided in accordance with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

Status of participation in the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database.

Status of participation in the nuclear security activities of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).

Japan participates in the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database and reports when incidents occur.

45

The Conference encourages all States parties that have not yet done so to become party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible.

Summary of progress in signing, ratifying and implementing the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

Japan became a party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2007.

46

The Conference encourages IAEA to continue to assist the States parties in strengthening their national regulatory controls of nuclear material, including the establishment and maintenance of the State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, as well as systems on regional level. The Conference calls upon IAEA Member States to broaden their support for

Summary of activities to strengthen national regulatory controls of nuclear material, including establishing and maintaining a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material, as well as any regional-level systems. Summary of cooperation with IAEA on accounting and control of nuclear materials.

Summary of support for IAEA programmes relevant to these actions, including the nuclear security relevant work of the IAEA

Japan, through the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security, actively organizes various bilateral seminars and workshops, international training courses for personnel of other member States to enhance the functions of their State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material, and some training courses for IAEA personnel, such as a training course on inspection methods for reprocessing processes both at the Japan Atomic Energy Agency experimental facilities and the Tokai Reprocessing Plant.

Action number	Actions	Examples of information to include (if applicable)	Actions taken by Japan
the relevant IAEA programmes, nuclear safety and security programme.			
III. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy			
47	Respect each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel cycle policies.	Summary of the types of peaceful uses of nuclear energy being pursued nationally (e.g., power generation, mining, medical, agricultural).	Japan pursues peaceful uses of nuclear energy in both power applications and various fields of non-power applications under the principle that the use of nuclear power must be accompanied at all its stages by commitments to and ongoing implementation of the highest standards of safety and security and effective safeguards with full transparency.
48	Undertake to facilitate, and reaffirm the right of States parties to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.	Summary of national policy on nuclear cooperation, including legislation on export controls.	See action 39.
49	Cooperate with other States parties or international organizations in the further development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.	Summary of national, bilateral, regional and or multilateral efforts to further the development and application of nuclear technologies to areas that will help to meet the needs of developing countries.	See the latest IAEA Technical Cooperation Report for examples of Japanese efforts: https://www.iaea.org/technicalcooperation/Pub Ann-Reports

Action number	Actions	Examples of information to include (if applicable)	Actions taken by Japan
50	Give preferential treatment to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries, in particular, into account.	Summary of international efforts to assist developing countries, identifying those activities which are undertaken through the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme.	See the latest IAEA Technical Cooperation Report for examples of Japanese efforts: https://www.iaea.org/technicalcooperation/PubAnn-Reports
51	Facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with articles I, II, III, and IV of the Treaty, and eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty.	List of the total number of countries with which nuclear cooperation agreements are in effect (see actions 37 and 38). List of the total number of nuclear cooperation agreements awaiting implementation.	See action 38.
52	Continue efforts, within IAEA, to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of its technical cooperation programme.	Summary of efforts to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, such as by advocating for accountability and transparency in the operation of the Programme, supporting the implementation of recommendations made by the Agency's Office of Internal Oversight Services, etc.	Japan is actively participating in relevant meetings held by IAEA to enhance effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, including of the Board of Governors and General Conference.
53	Strengthen the IAEA technical cooperation programme in assisting developing States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.	Summary of efforts in the IAEA Board of Governors Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee. Summary of efforts to strengthen the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, including through any voluntary financial or in-kind contributions.	Japan is actively participating in the Board of Governors Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee and Japan has also contributed to the Technical Cooperation Fund and Peaceful Uses Initiative to strengthen the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme.

Action number	Actions	Examples of information to include (if applicable)	Actions taken by Japan
54	Make every effort and to take practical steps to ensure that IAEA resources for technical cooperation activities are sufficient, assured and predictable.	Rate of attainment on assessed voluntary contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund.	The Japanese rate of attainment with regard to the Technical Cooperation Fund has been 100 per cent continuously.
55	Encourage all States in a position to do so to make additional contributions to the initiative designed to raise 100 million dollars over the next five years as extrabudgetary contributions to IAEA activities, while welcoming the contributions already pledged by countries and groups of countries in support of IAEA activities.	Summary of any voluntary contributions to the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative or other extrabudgetary contributions to IAEA.	Japan has contributed over \$28 million to the Peaceful Uses Initiative in total (as of February 2018).
56	Encourage national, bilateral and international efforts to train the necessary skilled workforce needed to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy.	Summary of national, bilateral and international efforts with regard to capacity-building and human resource development on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.	See the below links for examples of Japanese efforts: - Japan Atomic Energy Agency Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security (https://www.jaea.go.jp/04_iscn/activity_forum_en.html) - Japan Nuclear Human Resource Development Network (http://jn-hrd-n.jaea.go.jp/en/) - Regional Cooperation Agreement (http://www.rcaro.org/) - IAEA Response and Assistance Network Capacity Building Centre in Fukushima: https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-ranet-capacity-building-centre-fukushima-begins-work https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/school-of-radiation-emergency-management-held-in-iaea-capacity-building-centre

Action number	Actions	Examples of information to include (if applicable)	Actions taken by Japan
			https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/iaea-course-in-asia-and-pacific-region-focuses-on-the-use-of-radiation-monitoring-for-public-protection-in-a-nuclear-emergency https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/japan-to-support-use-of-ndi-technology-for-recovery-from-earthquakes-floods-in-asia-and-the-pacific
57	Ensure that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by commitments to and ongoing implementation of safeguards as well as appropriate and effective levels of safety and security, consistent with States' national legislation and respective international obligations.	Title and date of key national legislation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.	See the below link for examples: IAEA Country Nuclear Power Profiles, 2017 edition: Japan (https://cnpp.iaea.org/countryprofiles/Japan/Japan.htm).
58	Continue to discuss further, in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner under the auspices of IAEA or regional forums, the development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including the possibilities of creating mechanisms for assurance of nuclear fuel supply, as well as possible schemes dealing with the back-end of the fuel cycle without affecting rights under the Treaty and without prejudice to national fuel	Summary of efforts to develop multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.	See IAEA resolution GC (61) RES.11 entitled "Strengthening the Agency's activities related to nuclear science, technology and applications". Japan supports the resolution. The "Nuclear power applications" in the resolution refer to such items as jointly improving innovations in nuclear reactors and fuel cycles, as well as discussion among interested member States on the development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC61/Resolutions/index.html

cycle policies, while tackling the technical, legal and economic complexities surrounding these issues, including, in this regard, the requirement of IAEA full scope safeguards.

59	Consider becoming party, if they have not yet done so, to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and to ratify its amendment so that it may enter into force at an early date.	Status vis-à-vis the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. Status vis-à-vis the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment could be reiterated (see actions 42 and 45).	Japan has already concluded: - Convention on Nuclear Safety (1995) - Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (1987) - Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (1987) - Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1988) - Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (2003) - International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2007) - 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (2014)
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Division number	Actions	Examples of information to include (if applicable)	Actions taken by Japan
60	Promote the sharing of best practices in the area of nuclear safety and security, including through dialogue with the nuclear industry and the private sector, as appropriate.	Summarize how international best practices on nuclear safety and security have been implemented nationally. Summarize any contributions to the IAEA Safety Standards Series, the IAEA Nuclear Security Series and review meetings of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. Summarize any participation in or contributions to workshops to share best practices, including with the nuclear industry, private sector and non-governmental organizations such as the World Institute for Nuclear Security.	Please refer to the national report for the seventh review meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, in 2017: https://www.nsr.go.jp/data/000170377.pdf Please refer to the national report for the fifth review meeting of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, in 2015: https://www.nsr.go.jp/data/000110078.pdf Japan issued a statement by the Head of the Japanese Delegation, the Minister of State of Cabinet Office, Masaji Matsuyama, to the sixty-first session of the IAEA General Conference, on 18 September 2017: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000296206.pdf Japan issued a statement by the State Minister for Foreign Affairs, Kentaro Sonoura, Head of the Delegation of Japan to the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security, on 5 December 2016: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000209417.pdf At that conference, Japan announced its intention to work with IAEA to strengthen Japanese counter-terrorism measures, given that it will host the Olympic and Paralympic Games in Tokyo in 2020. In February 2018, Japan and IAEA signed the Practical Arrangements on Cooperation in the Area of Support to the Implementation of Nuclear Security Measures on the Occasion of the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games. http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/press11e_000021.html The Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security holds a workshop with the World Institute for Nuclear Security every year. The seventh such workshop was held in Tokyo on 24 and 25 January 2018. The participants discussed what to consider in the early stages of a nuclear security incident, focusing on the interface between safety and security.
61	Encourage States concerned, on a voluntary basis, to further non-peaceful uses of nuclear energy	Summarize any national efforts to reduce the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian nuclear	Japan issued its National Progress Report, 2016 Nuclear Security Summit. Please see the following page:

highly enriched uranium in civilian stocks and use, where technically and economically feasible.	programmes and/or convert nuclear facilities to low-enriched uranium. Summarize any international assistance provided to other States to reduce the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian nuclear programmes.	http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofai/files/000/44982.pdf
6.2 Transport radioactive materials consistent with relevant international standards of safety, security and environmental protection, and to continue communication between shipping and coastal States for the purpose of confidence-building and addressing concerns regarding transport safety, security and emergency preparedness.	Summarize national regulations on the transport of radioactive materials, noting in particular the implementation of the IAEA updated standards on transport regulations (No. SSR-6, 2012).	With the Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors, the Ship Safety Act, the Civil Aeronautics Act and other national regulations, Japan implements IAEA regulation No. SSR-6, 2012, and other international standards on transport regulations. Shipping States, including Japan, continued communication with coastal States for the purpose of confidence-building and addressing concerns regarding transport safety, security and emergency preparedness.
6.3 Put in force a civil nuclear liability regime by becoming party to relevant international instruments or adopting suitable national legislation, based upon the principles established by the main pertinent international instruments.	List the date of signature and ratification of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and/or the Paris Convention on Third-Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy. List the title and date of adoption of any national legislation on nuclear liability.	Japan signed and concluded the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage on 15 January 2015. The Convention entered into force on 15 April 2015. Please refer to the following link (IAEA Country Nuclear Power Profiles, 2017 edition; Japan) regarding the status of Japan vis-à-vis international nuclear liability instruments, as well as national legislation on nuclear liability: https://enpp.iaea.org/countryprofiles/Japan/Japan.htm

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The Conference calls upon all States to abide by the decision adopted by consensus at the IAEA General Conference on 18 September 2009 on prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction.

Summarize national position and efforts taken to prohibit (and prevent) armed attacks on or threats against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes during their operation or while under construction.

Japan issued its National Progress Report: 2016 Nuclear Security Summit. Please see the following page:

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000144982.pdf>

In order to prevent armed attacks on or threats against nuclear facilities, security guards and police officers protect nuclear facilities and conduct regular training to enhance their capability.

Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

National report submitted by New Zealand

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to action 20 of the action plan set out in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The plan stipulates that States parties submit regular reports on their implementation of the action plan, and of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", as well as the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, recalling also the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

2. New Zealand considers that transparency is a principle to which all States (nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike) should adhere because it helps to reinforce compliance with Treaty obligations. The more that is known about how States implement their Treaty commitments, the greater the level of international trust in the regime. In this spirit, New Zealand has consistently lodged transparency reports since the 2000 Review Conference and, in the light of action 20, will continue to do so.

3. Progress on nuclear disarmament is a high priority for the Government of New Zealand and we pursue this in all disarmament-related forums. The Government's decision to reinstate the Cabinet Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control reflects the priority New Zealand places on these issues. New Zealand is a strong supporter of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its three pillars. We are dedicated to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons and continue to encourage national, regional and global efforts to realize this goal.

4. New Zealand co-sponsored General Assembly resolution 71/258, mandating negotiations on a nuclear weapon prohibition treaty at the United Nations in New York in 2017. New Zealand was one of the vice-presidents in negotiations on the treaty and was one of the first countries to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in September 2017. New Zealand is looking at early ratification of the Treaty, so that we contribute to its early entry into force. We see the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons as complementing and strengthening the obligations contained in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and as a contribution to the implementation of article VI of the latter Treaty.



5. New Zealand has been a strong supporter of efforts undertaken to increase awareness of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. New Zealand remains gravely concerned about the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and continues to believe that the only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons are never used again is through their total elimination, including through the full implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We engaged actively in the three international conferences on this issue held since 2013 in Norway, Mexico and Austria and sought to ensure that any outcome to the 2015 Review Conference would reflect the humanitarian initiative. New Zealand also co-sponsored General Assembly resolution 72/30, on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. New Zealand co-sponsored the paper entitled "The humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons" (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.9), which was submitted to the 2018 Preparatory Committee by a group of more than 20 States.

6. New Zealand is an active member of the New Agenda Coalition¹ to promote nuclear disarmament. New Zealand is currently the coordinator of that coalition and will be coordinating its policy positions in the lead-up to the meeting of the Preparatory Committee. New Zealand has submitted one working paper on behalf of the Coalition to the 2018 Preparatory Committee entitled "Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: reiterating the urgency of its implementation" (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.13). The paper emphasizes that the commitments made and undertakings given at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences represent what States parties to the Treaty have agreed as necessary for implementation of the nuclear disarmament obligation in article VI. The paper reiterates that States parties remain accountable for their implementation of these agreed disarmament measures and highlights the responsibility of all States parties to the Treaty to move forward with urgency in implementing their article VI obligations and commitments in order to maintain the good standing of the Treaty and its review process.

7. The Coalition also sponsors an annual General Assembly resolution entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments". In its resolution 72/39, the Assembly highlighted the central role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its binding nature at all times and in all circumstances. The Assembly called on all States parties to the Treaty to comply fully with all decisions, resolutions and commitments made at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, and called upon Member States to continue to support efforts to identify, elaborate and negotiate effective legally binding measures for nuclear disarmament.

8. New Zealand also works with Chile, Malaysia, Nigeria, Sweden and Switzerland (the members of the De-Alerting Group) in promoting action to lower the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems. New Zealand will resume the role of coordinator of the De-Alerting Group from 1 July 2018 and will lead the development of this year's resolution in the First Committee of the General Assembly. In adopting the most recent resolution sponsored by the Group in 2016 (resolution 71/53), the General Assembly called for further practical steps to be taken to decrease the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems with a view to ensuring that all nuclear weapons are removed from high alert status and looked forward to the issue being addressed further during the next review cycle. New Zealand remains committed to progress in this area as part of a holistic approach to nuclear disarmament.

9. New Zealand remains a strong proponent of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and participates actively in the work of the

¹ Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa.

Preparatory Commission in Vienna. New Zealand is a core sponsor, with Australia and Mexico, of a regular General Assembly resolution on the Treaty, in which the Assembly has recognized the Treaty as a fundamental instrument in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation (see General Assembly resolution 72/70).

10. Pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, New Zealand urges all States to acknowledge the global de facto norm against nuclear testing and to maintain the moratorium on explosive nuclear tests and refrain from testing nuclear devices or from undertaking activities that would undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty. New Zealand has publicly condemned all nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including the most recent nuclear test on 3 September 2017.

11. New Zealand welcomes the monitoring and verification activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to assure the international community of compliance with the Plan of Action by the Islamic Republic of Iran. New Zealand fully supports the Plan of Action and is providing a further contribution of \$NZ 100,000 to IAEA to assist with its verification of compliance by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

12. New Zealand is deeply disappointed that sustained attempts to determine a programme of work in the Conference on Disarmament have not been successful, and that the Conference is failing to fulfil its role in progressing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In regard to the Conference's work programme, New Zealand supports the early negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty on fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, reflecting both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives.

13. Further to article VII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, New Zealand is a strong advocate of the role of nuclear-weapon-free zones in contributing to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. As a party to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty of 1985 (the Treaty of Rarotonga), New Zealand works to promote more engagement between States that belong to nuclear-weapon-free zones. We served as a Vice-President of the third Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia on 24 April 2015.

14. Together with Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa, New Zealand sponsors a General Assembly resolution entitled "Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas" (see General Assembly resolution 72/45). In that resolution, the Assembly recognizes the contribution of nuclear-weapon-free zones to the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world and notes with satisfaction that all nuclear-weapon-free zones in the southern hemisphere are now in force. It also calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to withdraw any reservations or interpretive declarations contrary to the object and purpose of the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones.

15. New Zealand welcomed the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review Conference and the agreement to convene a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. It is regrettable that the Conference has still not been held. We continue to call for full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and related agreements.

16. New Zealand fully complies with its commitments under article II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. New Zealand's Treaty obligations are legislated in the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act 1987.

17. Pursuant to article III of the Treaty, New Zealand has a comprehensive safeguards agreement, an additional protocol and a small quantities protocol in force with IAEA. With no nuclear weapons, no nuclear energy generation, no nuclear reactors and no production of uranium or other relevant material, New Zealand conducts only very minor activities subject to safeguards. IAEA continues to assess New Zealand as being in full compliance with all its safeguards commitments.

18. New Zealand strongly supports a system of strengthened IAEA safeguards as an essential component of the global non-proliferation regime. New Zealand believes that universal application of the integrated safeguards system, including the additional protocol, would promote collective security, and calls upon all States that have not yet done so to conclude such agreements at the earliest possible date. New Zealand continues to seek opportunities to strengthen the application of nuclear safeguards and supports efforts by IAEA to develop the State-level concept as a means of increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the safeguards system.

19. New Zealand's Radiation Safety Act 2016 enables New Zealand to more effectively meet its international obligations relating to radiation protection, safety, security and nuclear non-proliferation. In addition, New Zealand has ratified the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

20. New Zealand applies export controls to materials and dual-use goods that could be used in a nuclear weapons programme. The Government maintains cooperation and information exchanges among relevant government agencies involved in export controls and continues both domestic and international outreach in this area. The recent review of the Customs Act and moves under way to introduce domestic controls on arms brokering further strengthen the existing regime. We work actively to strengthen and coordinate international measures with other members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and with the Zangger Committee. As a member of the Zangger Committee, New Zealand co-sponsored the working paper entitled "Procedures in relation to exports of nuclear materials and certain categories of equipment and material under article III (2) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.12).

21. Further to article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, New Zealand reaffirms the inalienable right of States parties to peaceful nuclear technology, in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty, and continues to support the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative. It is an active participant in the IAEA Regional Cooperative Agreement for the Asia-Pacific region and also provides funding for international projects for peaceful uses. The view of New Zealand is that safeguards, safety, security and waste management should be integral parts of the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. New Zealand remains actively engaged in international efforts to strengthen nuclear safety and security, including through the Vienna-based dialogue between coastal and shipping States, the Nuclear Security Contact Group, the annual IAEA International Conferences on Nuclear Security and our contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund. New Zealand will contribute another SNZ 125,000 in 2018 to the Fund.

22. New Zealand is an active member of the Vienna Group of Ten,² which produces working papers for the Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycle on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, compliance and verification, export controls, cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nuclear safety and nuclear security, and discourages withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We co-sponsored the

² Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden.

composite paper and recommendations put forward by the Vienna Group of Ten to the Preparatory Committee at its 2018 session (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.5).

23. New Zealand participates in annual exercises hosted by participants in the Proliferation Security Initiative in the Asia-Pacific region. The Initiative is aimed at strengthening national, regional and international efforts to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related materials. In September 2017, New Zealand participated in "Exercise Pacific Protector", hosted by Australia, and will participate in "Exercise Pacific Shield" in Japan in July 2018.

24. In IAEA and other relevant forums, New Zealand continues to actively promote the safe transport of radioactive material. New Zealand is keen to ensure that the highest possible safety standards are adopted and applied by those transporting radioactive material, that coastal and other interested States receive notification in advance of shipments and that adequate liability arrangements are in place. New Zealand continues to participate in ongoing constructive dialogue, activities and coordination between relevant coastal and shipping States.

25. New Zealand remains committed to efforts to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education. Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (www.pnnd.org) helps New Zealand parliamentarians to stay abreast of international nuclear disarmament issues and initiatives through its regular updates and events at the Inter-Parliamentary Union Assemblies. The New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs gives regular briefings to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and endeavours to include NGO participants in relevant United Nations disarmament meetings. We included three New Zealand NGOs in the delegation of New Zealand to the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

26. The Government of New Zealand has established two funds to support a wide range of disarmament and peace education activities. The Disarmament Education UN Implementation Fund helps to fund citizen groups to implement the recommendations of the 2002 United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education. The Peace and Disarmament Education Trust provides postgraduate scholarships and grants for projects with charitable purposes that support the promotion of international peace, arms control and disarmament through education. Other projects partially funded using these funds include the creation of Peace Cities; museum exhibitions; relevant internships; peace libraries; the production of educational material for schools, journalists and university students; and visits by leading disarmament experts.

27. Peace Movement Aotearoa is the national networking peace organization. It has extensive national networks, a comprehensive website (www.converge.org.nz/pma) and a Facebook page. It provides national coordination, publishes resources and updates, and circulates the statements of New Zealand for the national campaigns of a number of global humanitarian disarmament campaigns, including the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons Aotearoa New Zealand. Peace Movement Aotearoa promotes activities to mark key dates, including Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific Day, Global Day of Action on Military Spending, International Women's Day for Peace and Disarmament, International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, International Day of Peace, and Hiroshima and Nagasaki days. It regularly reports to United Nations human rights bodies, raising disarmament issues whenever possible as part of its work to strengthen the links between disarmament and human rights.

28. The Peace Foundation (www.peace.net.nz), based in Auckland, provides a range of resources and activity ideas for peace education in schools nationally and globally. It also organizes the annual Schools' Peace Week event to commemorate the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In 2017, a total of 135 schools from across

New Zealand, as well as Australia, India, Kazakhstan, Germany, Burkina Faso, Kenya and Burundi, participated in Schools' Peace Week. The theme for 2017 was "Aotearoa New Zealand: 30 Years Nuclear Free". The Foundation also offers presentations to schools entitled "Responding to armed conflict", which cover topics such as nuclear disarmament, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, disarmament and development. The website www.nuclearfreenz30.org.nz also hosts educational material for social studies and history teachers and students about nuclear disarmament-related topics currently being taught in a number of schools.

29. The Disarmament and Security Centre (www.disarmsecure.org) in Christchurch provides a national peace and disarmament resource centre. The Centre's main activities include providing publicly accessible information on disarmament and peace issues through its website and physical library resources, speaking to university and community groups, research and advocacy, and training young people through its internship programme.

30. UN Youth New Zealand (unyouth.org.nz) is a non-profit organization aimed at fostering global citizenship that provides civics education for high school and tertiary students. Annually, over 3,000 young New Zealanders across the country attend a UN Youth event, including workshops, Model United Nations, international study tours and outreach events. UN Youth hosts two conferences nationally each year drawing together hundreds of students from across the country. An online diplomacy competition is also available for all high school students across New Zealand to help them to further develop their understanding of these issues. Through their conferences and initiatives, young people are encouraged to critically evaluate issues such as the use of nuclear technology and weaponry.

31. The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) Aotearoa (www.wilpf.org.nz) promotes disarmament through its involvement in the Aotearoa New Zealand Campaign on Military Spending, the Aotearoa New Zealand Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, the Aotearoa New Zealand Joint Working Group on Cluster Munitions and Landmines, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons Aotearoa New Zealand and White Poppies for Peace; and by publicizing international WILPF initiatives and resources, especially those produced by Reaching Critical Will and PeaceWomen, through its email lists and Facebook page. WILPF Aotearoa organizes regular peace vigils throughout each year and Hiroshima and Nagasaki commemorations every August.

32. Unfold Zero (www.unfoldzero.org) is a project of PragueVision, Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, the Basel Peace Office, the Mayors for Peace 2020 Vision Campaign, Aotearoa Lawyers for Peace and the Global Security Institute. It provides conference calls, email updates and social media promotion related to nuclear disarmament. Abolition 2000 Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons also informs NGOs about the wide range of nuclear abolition initiatives around the world through its website (www.abolition2000.org), Facebook page and newsletters.

**Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

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Geneva, 23 April–4 May 2018

**Joint Statement on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) by the Russian Federation and the People's
Republic of China**

NPT State-Parties:

- Confirm their unwavering support for the comprehensive and effective implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as endorsed by the UNSC Resolution 2231 (2015);
- Recognize that the sustainable implementation of the JCPOA proved to be a significant contribution in strengthening global nuclear non-proliferation architecture as well as international security as a whole;
- Persuaded that the conclusion of the JCPOA clearly demonstrated that non-proliferation issues can only be addressed through political and diplomatic means in accordance with the NPT;
- Support the essential and independent role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in verification and monitoring in Iran in light of the UNSC resolution 2231 (2015) and welcome the regular confirmations by the IAEA Director General that Iran is in full compliance with its commitments under the JCPOA;
- Support the role of the Joint Commission established to carry out functions assigned to it in the JCPOA;
- Emphasize the urgent necessity for all parties to the JCPOA to rigorously adhere to and fully implement their commitments under it, and for all NPT State-Parties to support the implementation of the JCPOA, including by refraining from actions that undermine implementation of commitments under the JCPOA.



**Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review
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Geneva, 23 April–4 May 2018

**Joint Statement on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) by the Russian Federation and the People's
Republic of China**

The Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China:

- Confirm their unwavering support for the comprehensive and effective implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as endorsed by the UNSC Resolution 2231 (2015);
- Recognize that the sustainable implementation of the JCPOA proved to be a significant contribution in strengthening global nuclear non-proliferation architecture as well as international security as a whole;
- Persuaded that the conclusion of the JCPOA clearly demonstrated that non-proliferation issues can only be addressed through political and diplomatic means in accordance with the NPT;
- Support the essential and independent role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in verification and monitoring in Iran in light of the UNSC resolution 2231 (2015) and welcome the regular confirmations by the IAEA Director General that Iran is in full compliance with its commitments under the JCPOA;
- Support the role of the Joint Commission established to carry out functions assigned to it in the JCPOA;
- Emphasize the urgent necessity for all parties to the JCPOA to rigorously adhere to and fully implement their commitments under it, and for all NPT State-Parties to support the implementation of the JCPOA, including by refraining from actions that undermine implementation of commitments under the JCPOA.



Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of the Action Plan Agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Australia*

Action 20 of the Action Plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference calls on States parties to submit regular reports on their implementation of the Action Plan as well as of the 13 Practical Steps towards disarmament contained in the 2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document, and of Article VI paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 NPT Review Conference decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament". Action 21 of the Action Plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference stated that, as a confidence-building measure, all nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security. Australia submits this report in accordance with these commitments, and using the reporting template attached to the NPT working paper on transparency (NPT CONF 2020/PC.II.WP.26).

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Nuclear Disarmament	
1	Australia's longstanding commitment to the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons remains undiminished. We hold ourselves to the highest standards of compliance with our non-proliferation obligations. As outlined in Australia's 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, we advocate a patient and pragmatic approach in a complex security environment. Australia's advocacy of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation has included a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests (the CTBT, which Australia ratified in July 1998), commitment to negotiations on a treaty to cap the production of fissile materials and efforts to address the technical requirements for verifying nuclear disarmament. We co-author (along with New Zealand and Mexico) the annual UNGA CTBT resolution, and co-chair, with Japan, the Friends of the CTBT. We are active participants in the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, and a member of the High-level Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) Expert Preparatory Group (EPG).

* The present document is being issued without formal editing.

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	Australia has continued its prominent and active role on non-proliferation and disarmament through membership of the 12-nation Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), which Australia and Japan founded in 2010. The NPDI's key objective is specifically to take forward the 64-point action plan from the 2010 NPT Review Conference, which was agreed by consensus and includes most of the steps required to advance the disarmament and non-proliferation objectives encapsulated by the NPT. Having submitted 17 working papers at the Preparatory Committee meetings of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, and a comprehensive working paper across all three pillars at the Review Conference itself, the NPDI is once again engaging constructively with a range of working papers for the 2017-2020 review cycle. To date, these include papers on CTBT, FMCT, disarmament and non-proliferation education and awareness-raising, promotion of peaceful uses, safeguards, NPT review reform, DPRK, and transparency. Australia is Chair of the 2018 UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC). Australia participated in the 2016 Open-Ended Working Group on Disarmament (OEWG), where we highlighted the need to pursue the practical, realistic measures necessary to achieve nuclear disarmament. Both at the OEWG and at the UNDC, Australia drafted and coordinated support for papers on the progressive approach to nuclear disarmament. Australia supports and promotes the role of women in disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control as part of its broader women, peace and security agenda which continues to be a key value and foreign policy priority for Australia. Gender is an issue of direct relevance to strengthening the NPT and has the potential to enhance the capability and effectiveness of NPT processes and their outcomes. Australia proposed an East Asia Summit (EAS) Statement on Non-Proliferation (co-sponsored by Myanmar) which was adopted by leaders on 8 September 2016. To give effect to this statement, Australia and Thailand co-chaired an EAS Seminar on Non-Proliferation in the Indo-Pacific in Melbourne in October 2017.
2	Australia reaffirms its commitment to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of its NPT obligations. Australia's support inter alia for the CTBT, the negotiation of an FMCT, IAEA safeguards, nuclear-weapon-free zones and transparency through reporting are consistent with that commitment. Transparency has long been a key focus of the NPDI, including over the 2015 NPT Review Cycle when we prepared a draft reporting template for NWS. The NPDI also submitted a working paper on NNWS transparency to the 2015 NPT RevCon, which included a draft reporting template for NNWS, and working papers on transparency by all States Party to the NPT for the 2017 and 2018 NPT PrepComs – with a template that Australia continues to use (see response to Action 19). Australia participated in several rounds of NPDI outreach to the P5 in Geneva (2014), New York (2014), London (2015), Washington (2016) and Geneva (2017 and 2018). This afforded further opportunities to underline the importance of transparency. Australia also conducted joint representations with Japan in Moscow, as part of coordinated NPDI outreach to all the P5 capitals to discuss P5 national reports to the NPT. Australia plays a leading role in the work of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV). We co-chair, with the Netherlands (and previously Poland) one of the IPNDV's working groups and contribute expert input to each of the groups. Australia also prepared working papers on inspections to verify the dismantlement of a nuclear weapon; and, with Japan, a joint working paper on transparency. Australia also co-sponsored the Norwegian-led "nuclear disarmament verification" resolution at UNGA71 (2016).

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6	Australia has consistently called for the adoption by the Conference on Disarmament (CD) of a program of work which would provide for the implementation of this action. Australia participated constructively in the CD's 'Way Ahead' working group in 2017 in an effort to find practical ways to unblock the CD. Australia continues to support efforts within the CD to resume substantive work and welcomes the establishment of five subsidiary bodies.
7	As a member of the CD, Australia supports the discussion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced program of work. Australia has consistently called for the adoption by the CD of a program of work which would provide for the implementation of this action. Australia continues to support efforts within the CD to resume substantive work. The NPDI produced a working paper on 'Nuclear-weapon-free zones and negative security assurances' for the 2013 PrepCom. That paper underlined the legitimate interest NNWS have in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances.
9	Australia is a strong supporter of nuclear-weapon-free-zones freely arrived at by Member States. Australia was an early champion of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and ratified the Treaty on 11 December 1986. To give effect to its obligations under that treaty, Australia enacted the <i>South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty Act 1986</i> , which, inter alia, prohibits possession of or control over nuclear explosive devices and the stationing of nuclear explosive devices in Australia. Australia advocates for all countries of the region to join the Treaty and continues to encourage the United States to ratify the Treaty's protocols without reservation. Australia supports dialogue between ASEAN members and the NWS on signature by the NWS of the Protocol to the South East Asian Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone. Australia also welcomed the establishment of the Central Asian Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone and the signing by the NWS of the protocols to that treaty. Australia participated in the third Conference of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZ) in New York in 2015. Australia has continued to co-sponsor the annual UNGA resolution (most recently 71/26 of 2016) on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Pelindaba) Treaty since the resolution was made open to non-African States for co-sponsorship at UNGA 65. Australia continues to support the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction, freely arrived at among States of the region. Australia encourages all interested parties in the region to engage in a spirit of genuine and constructive cooperation with the aim of finding a resolution to the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone issue. We, as part of the NPDI, submitted a working paper on 'Nuclear-weapon-free zones and negative security assurances' to the 2013 PrepCom, and a working paper on 'Establishing a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East' to the 2014 PrepCom. These papers underlined that NWFZs are an important means for enhancing global and regional peace and security.
11	Australia has enacted national legislation (the <i>Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Act 1998</i> (the CTBT Act) and the <i>Non-Proliferation Legislation Amendment Act 2003</i>) implementing the obligations of the CTBT, in preparation for its entry into force. In addition, Australia enacted the <i>South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty Act 1986</i> , which, inter alia, prohibits the testing of nuclear explosive devices. Through these statutes, a ban on nuclear testing is in force. The NPDI delivered a statement at the 20 th Anniversary CTBT PrepCom in 2016 on Strengthening the Norm against Nuclear Testing, which called on all States "to acknowledge and continue the global de facto moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions and refrain from any action that would undermine the CTBT's object and purpose."

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12	Australia's Minister for Foreign Affairs outlined Australia's activities in pursuit of CTBT entry into force in our national statement to the 2017 CTBT Article XIV Conference in New York on 20 September 2017.
13	The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Australia and Japan co-chaired a biennial "Friends of CTBT" Ministerial meeting in New York in 2016 during UN Leaders Week. The meeting endorsed a joint ministerial statement which demonstrated the international community's resolute opposition to nuclear testing and called upon all states to sign and ratify the CTBT without delay. Australia is working closely with Friends of the CTBT in preparation for the 2018 Ministerial meeting, which will aim to give further impetus to these objectives. With Mexico and New Zealand, Australia is lead sponsor of the annual UNGA resolution, which stresses the fundamental importance of the CTBT to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and urges its earliest entry into force. Australia underlined the importance of maintaining international momentum towards CTBT entry into force at the 20th Anniversary CTBT PrepCom in 2016 and at the Article XIV Conference in New York in 2017. Australia, as a member of the Vienna Group of 10, submitted a working paper on "Vienna Issues" to the 2018 NPT PrepCom which covered, inter alia, CTBT issues. Australia, as a member of the NPDI, submitted a working paper on CTBT to the 2017 NPT PrepCom which also strongly supported the Treaty's entry into force. Australia's support for CTBT entry into force also extends to contributing to capacity-building exercises for countries considering signature or ratification of the CTBT, especially countries in our own region. For example, in 2015 we worked with Myanmar and the CTBTO through a workshop in Myanmar ahead of Myanmar's ratification of the CTBT.
14	Australia hosts the third largest number of facilities in the CTBT's International Monitoring System, comprising 20 monitoring stations and a radionuclide analysis laboratory. Australia also actively supports the CTBTO in developing other aspects of its verification regime, including a leading role in developing on-site inspection procedures. Australia works with the CTBTO, through technical workshops and other outreach measures, to promote development of and cooperation between National Data Centres. Australia consistently calls on all states to provide strong financial, technical and political support to the CTBTO for its work on the CTBT verification regime.
15	Australia is a strong proponent of the commencement of negotiations for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, commonly known as the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). Australia, through its membership in the NPDI, submitted a working paper on FMCT to the 2017 NPT PrepCom. Australia is a member of the High-Level FMCT Expert Preparatory Group (EPG) established by UNGA resolution 71/259 of 2016 and is playing an active role in the group's deliberations. Australia was also a member of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on an FMCT, which produced a report in 2015. That report is the most thorough inter-governmental analysis to date of the issues surrounding an FMCT and will be built on by the 2017-18 EPG.
19	At their 9th Ministerial meeting in September 2017, Foreign Ministers of the 12-member NPDI endorsed a joint statement on the current challenges to nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and reaffirmed the critical importance of concerted action to work towards the shared goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Australia, as a member of the NPDI, presented a number of working papers on transparency during the 2015 NPT Review Cycle, and has continued this focus in the current NPT Review Cycle. NPDI working papers on transparency submitted to the NPT PrepCom sessions held in 2017 and 2018 highlighted Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the 2010 NPT Action Plan, encouraged the regular submission of transparency reports by the nuclear weapon states and promoted the use of a

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	standard reporting template by all States parties to report on their implementation of NPT commitments (especially the 2010 NPT Action Plan). Australia actively supports and contributes to the work of the IPNDV, including by drafting a joint working paper on transparency with Japan to stimulate discussion in working group 1 of Phase 1 of the IPNDV. That paper is now available on the IPNDV website. Australia also co-sponsored the Norwegian-led "nuclear disarmament verification" resolution at UNGA71 (2016).
20	This document updates the following reports by Australia: written reports on Australia's activities in support of the 2010 Action Plan submitted in 2017, 2015 and 2014; a verbal update in 2013 and a written report in 2012. Prior to this, Australia reported on implementation of article VI, paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision entitled 'Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament' in NPT/CONF.2010/36 of 7 May 2010.
22	The NPDI, in September 2011, announced it would actively promote disarmament and non-proliferation education to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. The NPDI produced separate working papers on this issue for the 2012, 2013 and 2017 PrepComs. Australia joined Japan, along with 30 other countries, as a co-sponsor for a statement on disarmament and non-proliferation education delivered to the 2013 NPT Prepcom. We again supported Japan's initiative in 2014. The Australian Government takes every opportunity to encourage informed community debate on disarmament and non-proliferation issues, for example through speeches delivered by Government Ministers and senior officials at numerous forums (including in academia, civil society and think tanks).
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	
23	In bilateral exchanges and statements in multilateral forums, Australia has consistently called for all non-NPT states to join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States and without preconditions. Australia has also conducted regional outreach activities promoting adherence to and fulfilment of NPT commitments, including through hosting capacity-building courses and workshops in Australia. The NPDI submitted a working paper on 'Addressing Withdrawal from the NPT' to the 2014 NPT PrepCom. Both the NPDI and Vienna Group of 10 working papers submitted to the 2015 NPT RevCon also include consideration of Article X. The Vienna Group of 10 working paper submitted to the 2018 NPT PrepCom includes a section on "discouraging withdrawal from the NPT".
24	Australia was the first country to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol (entry into force on 12 December 1997), the first to make it a condition of supply for uranium exports and the first for which the IAEA was able to draw the 'broader conclusion' that all nuclear materials and activities of safeguards relevance had been appropriately declared and accounted for. Australia not only promotes universalisation of and adherence to Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA) and Additional Protocols (AP) for all NPT non-nuclear-weapon States, but provides practical support to other States through assisting in workshops and training sessions. Australia, along with the other members of the Vienna Group of 10, has submitted a working paper to the 2018 NPT PrepCom which included the issues of compliance and verification. In this paper and all relevant forums, Australia advocates that the CSA and AP represent the current verification standard pursuant to Article III.1 of the NPT and for all States party to conclude and bring into force an AP as soon as possible.
25	Australia encourages all States that have not yet done so to bring into force a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, together with an Additional Protocol. Australia has facilitated discussions, provided expert advice and hosted workshops and study tours that assist States to bring into force these agreements. Australia, along with the other members of the Vienna Group of 10, submitted a working paper to the 2018 NPT PrepCom which included the issues of compliance and verification.

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26	Australia holds itself to the highest standards of compliance with its non-proliferation commitments and obligations, and cooperates fully with the IAEA. Australia consistently and strongly promotes universal compliance by states with their non-proliferation obligations, under the NPT and under their agreements with the IAEA, including through regular statements at the IAEA Board of Governors meetings. Australia, through the Vienna Group of 10, has presented a working paper covering, inter alia, compliance and verification issues to the 2018 NPT PrepCom.
27	Australia holds itself to the highest standards of compliance with its non-proliferation commitments and obligations, and cooperates fully and proactively with the IAEA. Australia consistently calls on all states to cooperate fully with the IAEA and to comply with their international safeguards obligations. Australia provided an extra-budgetary contribution for the IAEA to carry out verification activities in support of the P5+1/Iran Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
28	Australia signed the Additional Protocol on 23 September 1997, with entry into force on 12 December 1997. Australia actively encourages all states that have not yet done so to bring into force an Additional Protocol to their safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Australia consistently advocates that a CSA together with an AP represents the current verification standard under Article III.1 of the NPT.
29	Australia is a founding member of the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN), an informal network of safeguards authorities, ministries and other organisations responsible for implementing safeguards in the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. The objective of APSN is to promote safeguards best practice in the region. The Director-General of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office chairs the IAEA Director-General's Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation. Australia has hosted and assisted in safeguards courses run by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other partners in the Asia-Pacific region. For instance, in late 2016 Australia hosted a regional training workshop on Small Quantities Protocols (SQPs). Australia continues to engage with and support South-East Asian and Pacific Islands States on safeguards issues, particularly those States which have yet to conclude and bring into force Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, Additional Protocols (AP) and the modified Small Quantities Protocols with the IAEA. Australia has offered assistance to some States in the development of their safeguards agreements and arrangements with the IAEA.
30	The NPDI presented a working paper on Nuclear Safeguards Standards under the NPT to the 2018 NPT PrepCom. The NPDI also presented a working paper on 'Wider application of safeguards in the nuclear weapons states' to the 2013 NPT PrepCom.
31	Australia has never been eligible for a SQP. Australia consistently encourages all NPT States parties with older Small Quantities Protocols which have not yet done so to amend or rescind them, as appropriate, as soon as possible. Australia conducts outreach to states, where appropriate, to amend or rescind SQPs.
32	As a member of the IAEA Board of Governors, Australia supports the Director-General's and Board's efforts to continually strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards, including through the use of the State-Level Concept. Under the State-Level Concept, the IAEA has developed new State-level approaches for Australia. Australia welcomes the fact that new State-level approaches enhance the IAEA's ability to draw conclusions about Australia's implementation of safeguards obligations.
33	Australia always pays its assessed contribution and provides additional extra-budgetary contributions and in-kind support. Australia is a strong proponent of the IAEA carrying out its functions with the full cooperation of all States. One of the key elements of Australia's support to the IAEA is its active participation

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	on the IAEA Board of Governors and participation in the IAEA's Member State Support Programme since 1980. Australia maintains two diagnostic laboratories as part of the IAEA network of analytical laboratories.
34	Australia maintains a strong technology base and technical capabilities, which it makes available to contribute to international safeguards efforts. It also maintains an IAEA Member State Support Programme (MSSP) to support the Agency's technical safeguards capabilities. In November 2017, the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) hosted an IAEA Robotics Challenge under the MSSP, involving research groups from nine countries testing their customised robotics devices in land-based and water-based simulated IAEA inspection scenarios. Australia also maintains two diagnostic laboratories as part of the IAEA network of analytical laboratories.
35	Australia's uranium is exported for exclusively peaceful purposes and only to parties with which Australia has a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement. Australia's bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements include treaty-level assurances that Australian nuclear material will be used for peaceful purposes only, and that this material will be subject to IAEA safeguards. These agreements ensure that Australia's nuclear exports remain in exclusively peaceful use and may only be retransferred to a party with a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with Australia. Australia currently has 25 such bilateral agreements in force covering 43 countries plus Taiwan. Australia has ratified the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which is implemented by the <i>Nuclear Non-Proliferation Safeguards Act 1987</i> and the <i>Non-Proliferation Legislation Amendment Act 2007</i> , and is implementing Revision 5 of IAEA INFCIRC/225 (The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities).
36	Australia ensures that nuclear-related exports do not assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Australia's export controls are based on multilateral best practice. In addition, Australian nuclear agencies cooperate closely with law enforcement and customs agencies to enhance Australia's capability to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. Australia is a member of both the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee. The <i>Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations</i> of the <i>Customs Act 1901</i> states that any item on Australia's control list, the Defence and Strategic Goods List (DSGL), requires authorisation prior to export. The DSGL incorporates the NSG control list (parts I and II), the Zangger Committee Trigger List and Annexes 1 and 2 of the IAEA Additional Protocol. Australia advocates that states not members of the NSG adhere to the NSG's export control Guidelines. The Australian Government has also enacted the <i>Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prevention of Proliferation) Act 1995</i> ('WMD Act'). The WMD Act and the associated Regulations enable the Government to control the export or transfer of any goods and services that may assist a WMD program and which are not controlled under other legislation. The Vienna Group of 10 submitted a working paper to the 2018 NPT PrepCom which covered, inter alia, export controls. The NPDI also submitted a working paper on export controls to the 2013 NPT PrepCom.
37	See response to Action 35.
38	Australia has consistently affirmed its support for the development of nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes, within a framework that reduces proliferation risk and adheres to the highest international standards for safeguards, security and safety. The Vienna Group of 10 submitted a working paper to the 2018 NPT PrepCom which covered, inter alia, cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
39	Australia facilitates the transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States Parties through arrangements such as: the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research,

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	Development and Training in Nuclear Science and Technology for the Asia and Pacific Region (RCA); the Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia (FNCA); the IAEA Technical Cooperation Program; the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative; other IAEA programs; and bilateral arrangements.
40	Australia maintains the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, as was recognised by Australia's number one ranking for security of its nuclear materials from theft in the 2012, 2014 and 2016 Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) Nuclear Materials Security Index. Australia was an active participant in the series of Nuclear Security Summits (NSS) focused on implementing measures to improve the global nuclear security regimes, particularly against international terrorism, and has continued to promote implementation of NSS commitments through the post-summit Nuclear Security Contact Group (NSCG). Australia has contributed over AUD 2.4 million to the IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund since its inception, including support for the IAEA's activities in the Indo-Pacific region. In November 2013 Australia hosted an IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission and a follow-up IPPAS mission in November 2017. Australia has also provided experts to a number of other IPPAS missions. Australia has hosted and supported a number of table-top exercises in support of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Australia also chairs the GICNT Nuclear Forensics Working Group. Both the NPTDI and the Vienna Group of 10 (of which Australia is a member) have submitted working papers covering nuclear security.
41	At The Hague Nuclear Security Summit, Australia committed to realise or exceed the objectives of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 as part of the joint statements on strengthening nuclear security implementation.
42	Australia ratified the Amendment on 17 July 2008. As a member of the IAEA Board of Governors, we consistently draw attention in our statements to the importance of the 2005 Amendment and call on those who have not yet done so to become party to the amended CPPNM.
43	Australia has implemented the principles of the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, as well as the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2004. Australia has fully implemented the revised Supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2011.
44	Australia takes a leading role to actively contribute to the Incident and Trafficking Data Base (ITDB), through the detailed analysis, reporting and sharing of lessons learned when dealing with Material Out of Regulatory Control (MORC). These lessons greatly enhance international awareness and support the enhancement of international frameworks for nuclear safety and security. Australia encourages all States to continue to actively share lessons learned in order to support awareness and the strengthening of nuclear safety and security for MORC. The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation has a research program seeking to improve capabilities to detect illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, and has engaged in exchanges with regional partners in that regard. Australia enforces effective domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and works to enhance international cooperation to combat nuclear proliferation, including as a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) export control regime.
45	Australia deposited its instrument of ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) on 16 March 2012. To implement its obligations under ICSANT, Australia enacted the <i>Nuclear Terrorism Legislation Amendment Act 2012</i>. Australia has implemented its requirements under UNSCR 1540 and plays an active role in the UNSCR 1540 Committee. Also, Australia has taken every opportunity in its outreach on non-

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	proliferation to inform Asia-Pacific countries of the goals and obligations of 1540 and to offer to work with them to further improve and strengthen their capacity to implement the resolution where possible.
46	Australia, as an IAEA Board of Governors member, affirms its support for this recommendation. Australia further broadens its support for IAEA programs through participation in the IAEA's Member State Support Programme. Australia, through mechanisms such as support of IAEA Technical Cooperation projects and the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN), has assisted regional countries in strengthening their national regulatory controls of nuclear and other radioactive materials. Australia has requested and will host an IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission in 2018.
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy	
47	Australia respects each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and engages in extensive cooperation with other States parties and international organisations in the further development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses.
48	Australia has shared its experience with neighbouring countries in the safe application of nuclear science and technology through arrangements such as: the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training in Nuclear Science and Technology for the Asia and Pacific Region (RCA); the Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia (FNCA); the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI); other IAEA programs; and bilateral cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology. The RCA was extended indefinitely in 2017. Australia was one of the first states to accede to the 2017 version of the RCA.
49	As a member of the IAEA Board of Governors, Australia is involved in deliberations relating to all aspects of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (as noted elsewhere under Actions 32, 33, 46 and 58). The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) participates in the IAEA's Standing Advisory Group on Nuclear Applications (SAGNA) providing high-level input on priorities for the IAEA's research programs in nuclear technology. ANSTO has participated in the Sahel Project, educating IAEA fellows from the Sahel region in isotopic techniques for ground water research and management. ANSTO was designated an IAEA Neutron Scattering Collaborating Centre from 2009 to 2012, and as a Collaborating Centre for Multi-analytical techniques for materials research, environmental studies and industrial applications in 2016. These designations provide access for scientists and researchers from the region to facilities and expertise at ANSTO. Australia joined the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) in 2016. ANSTO entered into a Cooperation Agreement with the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) in the same year.
50	See response to Action 48.
51	See responses to Actions 35, 36 and 38.
52	Australia is a longstanding contributor to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF). In 2011, Australia provided AUD 100,000 in an extra-budgetary Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI) contribution to the IAEA for a Study on Marine Impacts of Radiation from the Fukushima Power Plant, and in 2012, contributed AUD 15,000 to the IAEA PUI to study Ocean Acidification. In 2014, Australia also contributed EUR 20,000 to the IAEA Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy (PACT). In 2015, Australia made a USD 20,000 in-kind contribution to the Sahel Project, hosting two fellows from the Sahel region. In 2015, Australia contributed EUR 600,000 to the Peaceful Uses Initiative to upgrade the nuclear applications laboratories at Seibersdorf as part of the IAEA's ReNuAl project. Australia's policy and practice has been to pay its annual TCF contribution in full and on time, and to encourage other States to do the same.

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	In addition to the TCF, Australia plays a key role in co-operation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the Asia-Pacific region. Australia's nuclear-related agencies, the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO), the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA) and the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) continue to provide experts to the IAEA and to hold a range of meetings with regional counterparts, as part of bilateral cooperation agreements and IAEA projects. Australia, through the Vienna Group of 10, presented a working paper on 'Cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy' to the 2013 NPT PrepCom; and on 'Vienna issues' to the 2014 NPT PrepCom, the 2015 NPT RevCon, and the 2017 and 2018 NPT PrepComs covering, inter alia, cooperation on peaceful uses.
53	See response to Action 52.
54	See response to Action 52.
55	In 2011, Australia contributed AUD 100,000 to the IAEA for a Study on Marine Impacts of Radiation from the Fukushima Power Plant. The study was administered by the IAEA and conducted under the Regional Cooperation Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology for Asia and the Pacific Region, a treaty level agreement to which Australia is a party. In 2012, Australia contributed AUD 15,000 to the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative to study Ocean Acidification. In 2014, Australia contributed EUR 20,000 to the IAEA Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy (PACT). In 2015, Australia made contributions totalling EUR 600,000 to the Peaceful Uses Initiative.
56	Australia in cooperation with the IAEA, and bilaterally, has provided training for international participants on a range of topics related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including specialised areas such as radiological crime scene evaluation, nuclear forensics, reactor decommissioning, ground water management, neutron scattering research, medical physics and the regulation of uranium mining.
57	See responses to Action 38 and Action 40.
58	Australia recognises the potential for proposals relating to multilateral fuel assurance mechanisms and multilateralisation of the fuel cycle to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation. Through its position on the IAEA Board of Governors, Australia has supported IAEA managed multilateral fuel cycle projects and proposals. Australia supports further discussion of this issue in appropriate international forums.
59	Australia is a party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (and its amendment).
60	Australia took an active part in the 2011 IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, which took forward lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident. At the conclusion of that plan, we supported the integration of relevant work into the regular program. ARPANSA participates in the development of the IAEA's Safety Standards, including senior representation on the Agency's Commission on Safety Standards through the CEO of ARPANSA, and representatives on all the Safety Standard Committees. With ASNO, ARPANSA has supported the establishment of the IAEA Nuclear Security Series by contributing to the development of the publications and attending meetings of the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee. Dr Geoff Williams of ARPANSA will be the vice-president of the Sixth Review Meeting of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management in May 2018.

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	The Deputy CEO of ARPANSA is a member of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) and is a rapporteur for the June 2018 session of UNSCEAR. In 2017, Australia contributed AUD 10,000 to the UNSCEAR Trust Fund to further the work of the Secretariat. In the margins of the IAEA General Conference, Australia has hosted a Friends of Responsible Uranium Mining (FoRUM) activity with industry involvement that provides a forum to share best practices in uranium mining. ANSTO played a role in the 2016 Nuclear Industry Summit, which brought together leaders of the nuclear industry to strengthen efforts in areas including cyber security and reducing the use of HEU in the civilian sector. Australia, through the Vienna Group of 10, presented a working paper on 'Vienna issues' to the 2018 NPT PrepCom, which covered, inter alia, nuclear safety issues. Australia coordinates the annual IAEA General Conference resolution, 'Measures to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety'. Australia participated actively in the series of Nuclear Security Summits culminating in 2016 and continues to promote implementation of summit commitments through its membership of the Nuclear Security Contact Group (NSCG). Through its membership of the Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and its chairing of the Nuclear Forensics Working Group, Australia hosts and participates in practical discussions and exercises to address potential nuclear security events (see also Action 40). Australia regularly requests IAEA peer review missions and will host an IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission in 2018.
61	Australia has minimised its possession and use of highly enriched uranium through the exclusive use of low-enriched uranium (LEU) for its nuclear research reactor fuel and for targets used in the manufacture of medical radioisotopes. This year, Australia expects to increase its capacity to supply the main nuclear medicine isotope, molybdenum-99, to approximately 25% of global needs. Australia's success in this regard has demonstrated that there is no technical reason for the use of HEU in radioisotope production. Australia has also reduced its remaining stocks of highly enriched uranium. Australia is sharing its experiences in the use of LEU in research reactors and radioisotope production, both bilaterally and by participating in IAEA and OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) initiatives, including the High-Level Group on the Security of Supply of Medical Radio-isotopes (HLG-MR). In June 2014, Australia signed a Ministerial Joint Declaration to support the OECD initiatives. Australia is actively participating in preparations for the HEU Minimisation Symposium in June 2018. Australia, through the Vienna Group of 10, presented a working paper on 'Vienna issues' to the 2018 NPT PrepCom, which covered, inter alia, the issue of HEU minimisation under the heading of nuclear security.
62	Australia works to meet the highest standards of safety, security and environmental protection in the transport of radioactive materials through its stringent regulation of nuclear activities, including uranium mining, which takes into consideration all IAEA requirements and recommendations. In 2015, Australia oversaw the safe return from France of Intermediate Level Waste arising from the reprocessing of spent fuel from our first research reactor, HIFAR. Australia also participates in the IAEA Shipping and Coastal States Transport Dialogue.

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63	Australia supports the principles enshrined in the nuclear liability conventions adopted in 1997 and 2004: the 1997 Vienna Convention; the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage; and the 2004 Protocol to the Paris Convention. Australia has signed the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage and is working towards its ratification. At the invitation of the Director-General of the IAEA, an Australian expert chairs the IAEA International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability (INLEX).
64	Australia abides by this decision.